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by shifting towards a complexity economics approach. In so doing we concentrate on the
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2Introduction
Since the outbreak of the 2008 global financial and economic crisis, the global economy has
been under extreme stress. However, an increasing number of people is hoping that Industry
4.0 and the Digital Economy will be an effective answer to one of the thorniest challenges of
today: to the ailing growth performance of the developed countries. With the new
manufacturing philosophy and operation method based on the Industry 4.0 and the Internet of
Things (IoT), integrated and online cyber-physical systems are emerging through the
interconnection of resources, machines and even that of the logistics systems by creating the
so-called smart factories that are barded with independent and self-optimizing local production
processes promising ever-more efficiency.
Nevertheless, Industry 4.0 (and the Digital Economy) must be a constituent of an
extremely complex socio-economic configuration. Assessing the impacts of Industry 4.0
therefore necessitates a broader approach especially when the global socio-economic situation
is so stressful. Hans Selye, known as the “father of stress-theory”, once emphasised that we
will never know the beauty of a gothic cathedral through the mere chemical test of its building
blocks. We must take into account the whole architecture and its interactions with the wider
context to give a fairer picture about what beauty is.
In this spirit, our working paper is to present a more realistic picture of Industry 4.0 and
the Digital Economy by concentrating on the complexity of relationships in their development
in an effort to decipher the major set of unintended consequences. Without these, what we only
have is just a confused (gotico) picture about the economy. We emphasise that owing to the
complexity of the world economy, there is a great deal of uncertainty about whether
government interventions designed to foster the development of the Industry 4.0 and the Digital
Economy will offer enough capacity to compensate the “losers”: it means that reaching Kaldor–
Hicks efficiency is extremely difficult.i Based on the insights gained in our working paper, we
3formulate the basic principles of an intelligent economic governance having the potential to
contribute to the sustainable development of Industry 4.0 and the Digital Economy.
Complexity of Industry 4.0 - Context and the unintended consequences
One of the most intricate puzzles of economics today is that: Why do we experience secular
stagnation in the developed worldii (i.e. weakening innovation performance with lessening
productivity gains) while an unprecedented range of technologies is available together with
overwhelming digitalization that has never seen before? If we apply systems view, a knot of
simultaneous and interconnected channels behind the global slowdown can be recognised: 1)
the global financial and economic crisis of 2008; 2) the decelerating catching up process of
major emerging markets with discernible structural adjustments towards a more sustainable
and slower growth; 3) in the developed world, mainly in Europe, the complexity of regulation
and the negative effects of weakening competition are more vigorous at a time of recession; 4)
the hobbled character of firms’ productivity growth via technology and innovation had been
widely observable already in the pre-crisis period; 5) the harmony between the financial sector
and the real economy is broken in favour of the former one of which traditional intermediary,
wealth-generating role has been to a large extent relegated with respect to supporting the real
economy. Financial investments has become one of the most profitable areas over real
economy investments by creating a parasitic-like financial sector and by encoding bubbles,
systemic risks, low corporate investment rate, low propensity for innovation;iii and 6) ever-
increasing inequality undermining social trust having a negative feedback on withering
economic dynamisms in the form of vicious spiral.
Thus, Industry 4.0 and the Digital Economy evolve in an open, adaptive, complex
socio-economic innovation ecosystem characterised by the non-linear feedbacks.iv Therefore,
it is rather strange that available studies are merely focusing on the positive effects of Industry
4.0 while not mapping the interactions that may warn of unintended negative consequences.
4In the followings, we ravel out the above mentioned concerns to have a more systemic
view on Industry 4.0. Five areas are, at least, worth mentioning: (i) increasing security-related
uncertainty; (ii) paradox consumption patterns; (iii) unintended consequences of automation;
(iv) distorting measurement; and (v) unintended consequences of neglecting other contextual
interactions. These all function as a centrifugal force disrupting the delicate processes of
Industry 4.0 and the Digital Economy.
Increasing security-related uncertainty
Cyber-physical systems, and the digital universe per se, not only raise the issue of cyber
security (data security, systems fault tolerance, cyber resiliency etc.) but has already been the
subject of serious analyses. Such development of production systems also increases the risk of
fragility, v thus induces additional uncertainty beside fundamental uncertainties in the
innovation ecosystem. vi Suffice it to cite the Chapman University’s survey about what
Americans feared the most in 2016.vii The survey revealed that cyber-terrorism ranks second
behind corruption. It was followed by the fear of data malpractice first on the business side
then on the government side. Theft of personal data, credit and debit card fraud were also
named as areas of concerns. Data security and protection against unauthorised persons are
becoming hot topics as series of company studies showing that enterprises feel threatened by
the risks of cyber-attacks fuelled by Industry 4.0.viii And once a widespread perception over
inefficient cyber security is here to stay, the speed of technology adoption and diffusion (and
trade integration in knowledge-intensive sectors) can suffer by overshadowing productivity
outlooks. Another security aspect related to the development of Industry 4.0 and the Digital
Economy is that statistical institutions, as authorised and dominant data collectors and
providers, are facing a new challenge. The whole gamut of data is not exclusively the result of
their own work, not to mention that extracting, recording and interpreting data will presumably
5not be limited to be done within the ‘firewall’ of these offices. As a result, several uncertainties
are surrounding the questions of defence and integrity.
Paradox consumption patterns
As time passes, the circle of cheaper technologies for improving energy efficiency is widening
that may eventually lead to increased energy consumption (i.e. Jevons-paradox).ix It means that
considerable government support geared towards the production and the use of renewable
resources may induce exactly the opposite effect of what policy originally intended to achieve.x
Supporting the spread of Industry 4.0 may also have a bubble-generating power when, for
instance, there is a conspicuous over-investment in robotics irrespective of the capacity of the
state and that of the needs of the innovation ecosystem. China is a case in point. In 2014, there
were only 200 companies specialized in robotics in Shenzhen, whereas this number exceeded
3,000 in 2016. In 2014, 227,000 industry robots were sold worldwide, of which 56,000 were
imported by China, and one year later, that import rose to 66,000.xi After only a few hundred
industrial, professional, and household robots in use, their number grew to 3,400 by 2016.xii
An increasing number of big Chinese cities declared their demand for robotics (36 cities in
2016), 77 local governments have already initiated programs for robotics-development. What
is more, fundraising in robotics is of high priority in China’s next Five-Year Plan with the aim
at tripling their robot production by 2020. Still, there are signs casting doubt on overly sanguine
views about the skyrocketing robotics in China. Corruption and fraud have also appeared
causing significant distortions (more than 65 per cent (!) of net profits of firms, specialized in
robotics development in Nanjing, stemmed from state aid). With ineffective state support,
uncompetitive products are being produced that are far from the global frontier. In fact,
domestic robot-sales simply remain a wishful thinking (85% of the robots sold in China are
imported or built domestically using imported components). Policymakers working on the
6European Industry 4.0 should therefore be aware of the fact that supporting measures tailored
to robotics, as a radically new physical capital (supporting human capital during cooperation),
can spur rent-seeking and they may potentially crowd out capital investments in more
traditional fields.
The Jevons paradox requires further investigation on whether greater consumption may
be triggered by the fact that warehouses equipped with robots can easily multiply the handling
amount of merchandizes, thus they are able to fulfil more orders (Rotman, 2013). The issue of
sustainable manufacturing and consumption arise here, especially if one also consider that the
information society entailing thriving interconnections gave rise to more efficient mapping of
consumer habits having the potential to intensify manipulation to reach out artificially
generated demand.xiii These are non-linear spillovers necessitating demand and supply-side
policies alike in the interest of sustainable development. Regulation on the supply-side (e.g.
incentives to promote the principle of minimizing losses) and nudge techniques (Thaler and
Sustein, 2009) on the demand side may also be worth considering.
Unintended consequences of automation
The first complex question is the impact of automation on employment. The sustained
development of Industry 4.0 and Digital Economy can only be cultivated via inclusive growth
that safeguards political stability through strengthened social trust. However, there are voices
envisaging enormous job losses due to automation and machine learning.xiv It is calculated that
47 per cent and 54 per cent of jobs in the United States (Frey and Osborne, 2013) and in Europe
(Bowles, 2014) can be displaced by computerization. The experience has shown that cost-
cutting measures usually come with cost-reducing and efficiency-increasing technological
developments (automation of routine tasks) primarily at a time of recession.xv It implies that
the current economic situation tends to encourage automation. Nonetheless, the wider context
7and certain tendencies suggest that computerization of mass labour force will only be possible
gradually. The chain of reasons is as follows. 1) Automation is likely to be typical in case of
jobs with no shortage of labour.xvi 2) Developed countries are portrayed not only by jobless
growth but also by jobless stagnation (e.g. rising youth unemployment and slow employment
of older low-skilled workers)xvii due to anaemic growth, computerization will therefore only
make things worse, unless the displaced workforce is absorbed elsewhere in the economy. 3)
If such absorption failsxviii, then the position of the already indebted private sector will be more
difficult by engendering further increases in the already high ratio of non-performing loans.
Excessive volume of domestic loans to the private sector (i.e. increasing share of non-
performing loans), is one of the top crisis indicators (Balgova et al., 2016). Since excessive
borrowings has been prevalent for the past two decades, applying for individual bankruptcy
within a year after losing job became three times more likely to happen compared to previous
periods (moreover, job loss in the manufacturing sector is 40 per cent more likely to cause
bankruptcy) (Keys, 2015). For these reasons, expecting a fast automation of jobs would be
naïveté.
The second complex issue is the impact of computerization on people’s mental status.
Beyond the empirical evidence that dismissal increases criminal activity (Bennett and Ouazad,
2016), digitalization and automation may harm people’s mental and physical health. It is hardly
by chance that ‘The Art of Living with Information and Communication Technologies (ICT)’
branch of literature has emerged (Lemmens, 2017). ICT made employees available 24 hours a
day; the real-time data-based analytical methods may increase the expectations of executives
from employees to respond and make decisions as early as possible; while more and more
people work in the crossfire of more sophisticated monitoring and controlling applications; and
as Industry 4.0 is unfolding, employees have to compete even with machines. So stress may
arise more vigorously in certain areas, while it may moderate elsewhere.xix Additionally,
8mental and health risks associated with home, mobile and telework type of jobs are also
revealed (i.e. adverse frustration by broken work-life balance, Kovacs (2013)).
All in all, gradualism could help mitigating the risks associated with automation,
because the necessary training programs and the development of other horizontal policies are
rather time-consuming.
Distorting effects of measurement
The first aspect here usually refers to ICT statistics. Uncertainty related to ICT statistics arises
from several facts. On one hand, ICT will be found everywhere and in almost everything in the
future, which poses a challenge to the methodology of statistical offices in the sense that
differentiating products with ICT from products without it is less and less obvious. On the other
hand, the fact that statistical data do not necessarily mirror certain economic theories does not
by all means require intervention. According to a theory, with increasing investments in
knowledge capital (e.g. training, vocational training, product and service design, organisational
development) we should have already seen growing trend in productivity statistics. However,
this requires much more time (van Ark et al., 2016). According to the prevailing theory and
empirics, investments in ICT should also be reflected in productivity statistics. Today, however,
considerable investments in ICT equipment (ICT hardware, ICT software, and
telecommunication tools) are not as much needed as it were before the appearance of cloud
technology and services. In other words, there is a shift from investing in digital fixed assets
toward purchasing digital services (data processing, computer and network design, related
computer services, etc.). In this respect, there is another statistical distortion as more and more
companies do not buy but develop such services on their own. As a corollary, the traceability
of technology diffusion from the statistics has become ever-more cumbersome. The puzzle of
why we experience secular stagnation in the developed world despite the increasingly
9pervasive digitalisation is relevant because if it were proven that we can only hope a modest
productivity contribution from digitalisation, business investment decisions and market
behaviour would change fundamentally via expectations. All in all, by measuring we are
recurrently creating events.
The second aspect deals with the risk of distortion lurking in Big Data-based approaches.
Contrary to the growing belief, we argue that Big Data complements and by no means replaces
scientific research and business analyses. Too much data do not inevitably make us more
informed by leading to better decisions. Big Data is expected to accelerate our scientific
understanding about the world in a way of “numbers speak lauder than words and often speak
for themselves". At the same time, Big Databases do always contain discretionary correlations
given primarily by the size and not by the nature of the data (Calude and Longo, 2016).xx There
may be several hidden errors in these databases and even a tiny failure can lead to
misinterpretations. There is a lack of capacity for monitoring the consistency of databases and
that of the credibility of dataxxi, particularly if it is a public, free to use and modify database
(i.e. there is a possibility for ‘fishing in the dark’.) An important lesson here is that albeit Big
Data do help in better documenting the past, the human factor providing moral and social
dimensions will still be the conditio sine qua non of proper decision making.
In the era of Industry 4.0, one of the cardinal areas for using Big Data is to refine
forecasts, i.e. when we attempt to extract more and near real-time data that paint presumably a
clearer picture about what is really happening in the socio-economic system. This new research
field, called nowcasting,xxii is usually an Internet-based search approach (e.g. Google Trends)
or it is based on more granular micro-transaction data (such as FRED, Data.gov, SWIFT, Pulse
Index, etc.). Some believe that this new approach offers more accurate predictions in certain
areas (e.g. evaluating demand for products and services of Industry 4.0; monitoring of diffusion
etc.).xxiii Scientific debates on the applicability of this technique suggest that the extensive
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observation of high-frequency indicators through nowcasting procedures makes our models
and, what is more, our picture of reality even noisier.
In addition, many fail to acknowledge the fact that psychology explains the volatility
of financial markets and the evolution of sovereign debt much better than macroeconomic
fundamentals. This is a challenge for Big Data because of the crucial importance of non-
quantifiable, difficult-to-measure aspects. We should therefore go beyond the Mephistophelian
reasoning that ’What you don’t count on can’t be true, What you can’t weigh won’t weigh, of
old, What you don’t coin: that can’t be gold’. Gennaioli et al., (2015) has illustrated vividly the
undeniable role of psychological site. Their model–based analysis revealed that we tend to
overestimate the likelihood of an event that is relatively more likely to happen in the light of
recent data and observed (experienced) events. Hearing good news, investors tend to calculate
positive scenarios and to underestimate the possibility of a negative event. The same investors
tend to regard bad news as temporary aberrations, so they do not react sufficiently, while they
tend to overreact when a troublesome situation occurs. This psychological insight not only
allows us to better understand the anatomy of boom-bust cycle, but it also implies that our real-
time concept of the economy is significantly different from what we are weighting from a
historical perspective (i.e. fluctuations are weighted in a broader context and always with
hindsight).
Bearing the above in mind, in the age of Industry 4.0 and Digital Economy, the
differentiated application of Big Data in economic policy is in order (especially for forecasting).
The normal business cycle does not necessarily require monitoring as it may result in
distortional noises (i.e. unfounded or misconstrued interventionism causing hectic fluctuations).
This draws attention to the arrow of time in the spirit of complexity science, that is to say, there
are irreversibilities in the system (e.g. the impact of a policy triggering hectic and negative
effects cannot be fully eliminated from the system, it lives further in memories, in expectations,
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collectively in the psychic capital). Hectic fluctuations can be rather harmful for the socio-
economic innovation ecosystem by disrupting the trust infrastructure and the overall innovation
dynamism. Never forget one of the basic characteristics of large databases: even a small error
could cause significant distortion (and, of course, data manipulation is also in the cards, e.g.
lobbyists manipulate to get certain interventions favourable only for them). Contrary to ‘high
flying’ futurists ‘down to earth’ economists should therefore recognise that using Big Data
during the business cycle is more likely to encode instability into the system and to paint a
confused (gotico) picture about reality. By the same token, application of Big Data seems to be
more appropriate in case of sudden-stop type situations and in recessionary periods.
Unintended consequences of neglecting contextual interactions
The first set of unintended consequences stems from the negligence of the interaction between
developed and emerging countries. The second one occurs when the scientific community is
skating over the different time horizons of the financial markets and that of the industrial policy.
The third one is given by the ignorance of the interplay between labour market flexibility and
industrial policy.
As far as the first set of unintended consequences is concerned, it is very likely that
Industry 4.0 and the emergence of the Digital Economy are hacking the wage-competition
model of international competitiveness. If new production processes and the production of
available technologies become cheaper, the global power of wage-based competition will
dampen. Undoubtedly, most if not all emerging markets and developing countries will confront
with this challenge, hence the global value chain will go through a dynamic transformation.
Available evidence supports this scenario by confirming the fact that productivity of ICT-
producing industries has improved as the prices of ICT products and services have fallen, thus
overall real wages could also decline (Hoon and Phelps, 2006; Byrne and Corrado, 2016).xxiv
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If manufacturing sectors providing the tools and services of Industry 4.0 follow a similar path,
then expecting even stagnating real wages would be a rather pollyannaish view, which still
does not help us reducing inequality and making job-saving growth more inclusive, either.
Furthermore, this path may also limit fiscal capacities by threatening the sustainability of the
generous welfare states in Europe (e.g. the option of universal basic income in the new digital
age arises again).
As regards the second set of unintended consequences, there is an inconsistency in
terms of time horizons between the financial sector and industrial policy aiming at fostering
Industry 4.0 and the Digital Economy. The financial sector prefers short-term returns over
longer term investments due to a series of inherent factors (ESDN, 2012); while industrial
policy must be engaged in longer-term considerations acknowledging sustainable development.
The current context of low-productivity, thus low-growth and low-inflation, and the uncertainty
rising from it only further enhances the culture of short-termism in the financial markets.xxv
Nevertheless, the sustainable promotion of Industry 4.0 requires longer-term lending culture to
take root. This inter alia calls for regulatory changes, appropriate incentive regimes and good
governance in general.xxvi Without addressing the different time horizons, the effectiveness and
efficiency of industrial policy will fall far below the original ideas.
The third set of unintended consequences is given by the interaction between labour
market flexibility and industrial policy. Industrial policy at national or EU-level should take
into account the regulatory environment of the labour markets. Importantly, making the labour
market more flexible is not without side effects. According to a conventional wisdom of the
innovation-related economics literature, a flexible labour market facilitates while a stricter one
stifles innovation thus the productivity potential. In principle, a more flexible labour market
makes innovative companies able to rapidly hire or fire employees with lower costs when
innovating. In addition, the use of various analytical methods and processes build on Big Data
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would also require more flexible labour market regulation ('people analytics' – for selecting,
enrolling, monitoring and developing the best labour force etc.). Note, however, that the United
States with one of the most flexible labour markets has been facing a rather sluggish wage
growth for decades (i.e. stagnating median income of households) while the EU12 with stricter
labour market regulation has seen some increase. xxvii It per se implies that stagnating
productivity has been partly the result of stagnating wages (i.e. the impaired practice of
performance-related pay) demotivating workers to spark innovation. All of this suggests that
more flexible labour market regulations are not necessarily leading to positive improvements.
In contrast to the often expressed view, the relationship between wages and productivity is not
a one-way street (Storm and Naastepad, 2012). If productivity increases, wages could be higher.
However, increasing a relatively low and stagnating wage level might spur the overall
innovation performance by ameliorating productivity. There are inherent hindrances in our
socio-economic innovation ecosystem to the rapid diffusion of automation-enabler
technological and non-technological innovations. Consequently, the deregulation of EU labour
markets in a non-differentiated way may lead to decreasing wage growth in certain countries
by potentially dissuading innovation and also by harming the sustainability of public finances
through weakened productivity.
Notwithstanding the arguments outlined above, automation and digitalisation serve as
a driver of labour market deregulation with the aim at reducing the costs of employment and
fostering the quick absorption of redundant employees elsewhere. Whereas strict employment
protection increases the labour costs of companies, they are more likely to curb R&D and
innovation activity while preferring high-skilled labour force. It transpires that, paradoxically,
low-skilled workers are not protected by the system! Cette et al., (2016) revealed that adopting
the US-like low-level employment protection to Europe would significantly lower the share of
high-skilled and better educated workers within the total employment at the expense of the
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low-skilled workers. The highest fall in the share of highly qualified workers would be found
in France (-22 %), while a 13 percent shrinkage is expected in case of Austria and Germany.
They are those whose work involves more sophisticated activities of which automation and
robotization promise more savings for employers. For this reason, not only the low but also the
highly skilled workers are facing increasing unemployment which violates the declared
requirement of inclusiveness and affects negatively the sustainability of public finances. This
highlights the importance of differentiated diagnosis and gradualism when (industrial) policy
is to increase the flexibility of labour markets. Not to mention that low level of employment
protection could deteriorate employee’s loyalty, weaken organisational memory, devaluate
different types of trainings and establish the anxiety culture. But do not forget that the flexible
labour market of the United States has been developed in an organic way. Additionally,
psychological studies also pinpoint the fact that we are twice as sensitive to losses as to gains,
hence people in the EU will probably have to abandon the existing level of employment
protection that would not be particularly conducive to the sustainability of welfare states, either.
The clear inference is that expecting productivity improvement from the deregulation of labour
markets in Europe can easily be just a forlorn hope.xxviii
Conclusion
Economics teaches us temperance both in terms of self-confidence and modesty. With the
presented bright palette of unintended consequences of Industry 4.0 and the Digital Economy
as signals of their complexity, our working paper is to inveigh against over reductionist or
utopian recommendations. xxix The success of this transformation depends not only on its
technical feasibility but also on its social acceptability. If the latter precondition is not met,
supporting the transformation might be politically excessively destabilizing. We therefore
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formulate the basic principles of an intelligent economic governance which can contribute to
the sustainable development of Industry 4.0 and the Digital Economy.
Festina lente: The undisputable nature of the festina lente (make haste slowly)
principle is given by the outlined unintended consequences emerging inevitably due to the
increasingly complex socio-economic system. In the context of sluggish growth, low inflation,
limited fiscal space, and with a view to the fundamental resources needed to develop Industry
4.0 and the Digital Economy (initial investments, trainings and learning time, more flexible
labour markets, etc.), and by taking into account the risks associated with the wide and rapid
transition to Industry 4.0, our conclusion is, without all the jazz, that graduation is more a virtue
rather than a sign of helpless policymaking. This principle must be reflected both in the time
horizon and the institutional functioning of relevant policies (e.g. sustainable, unbiased support
system with accountability, transparency and discipline) in an effort to achieve Kaldor–Hicks
efficiency (i.e. to continuously create the capacity for compensating the “losers” of the
transformation).
Systems approach: The transformative power of Industry 4.0 and digitalisation calls
for a much broader policy and business perspective to map and better understand the
interactions featured with non-linearity, reflexivity and spillovers (e.g. the interaction between
the financial sector and the real economy). Systems view recognises that today’s innovation is
no longer coming from well-defined areas but from the intersections of various disciplines.
Systems view rests on broader and interdisciplinary collaborations and on the development of
policies stabilizing and strengthening the trust infrastructure within the social-, economic-, and
environmental innovation ecosystem (e.g. cooperation in fields like Big Data based predictive
analytics among public innovation laboratories, independent fiscal and monetary bodies, and
EU institutes). Such collaboration may provide a greater scope for taking into account potential
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unintended consequences. Similarly, testing and evaluating maturity for Industry 4.0 also
require a systemic approach.
Differentiated diagnosis and intervention: European economies have different
formal and informal institutions together with different regulatory bases, thus their capability
for structural change is also varying across the board. Consequently, in some areas
standardization is in order (e.g. creating international standards to give new élan into the spread
of Industry 4.0; handling and regulating cross-border data; capacity building of statistical
offices; product and service market reforms, etc.), while other areas need more context-
dependent interventions (e.g. fiscal consolidation with development functions in peripheral
countries; labour market reforms). Policies with systems view, including industrial policy,
should focus on creating interactions to strive to really productive public investments (that are
regenerating and resuscitating private sector investments as well) in supporting the diffusion
of the positive impacts of Industry 4.0.
Widening and outbalancing opportunities (equability): Cultivating sustainable
development and promoting well-being still remain the raison d'être of good governance which
is fully aware of the need for structural change by incorporating the complexity of Industry
4.0 and the digital transformation. If secular stagnation described in our working paper played
a significant role in the development of the modern innovation ecosystem being pervaded by
increasing income inequalities and coupled with the underutilisation of the human capital, then
supply and demand side policies are required for a healthy ecosystem (e.g. encouraging social
innovations on the demand side). This requires a governance approach that focuses on the
development of individual opportunities (equability) rather than the total elimination of income
inequalities. There is a need for a governance that revises the paradigm of pursuing the further
extension of the welfare state whereby the culture of entitlements can be mitigated, talent
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development can be stimulated, the overall innovation performance and the development
ability can be improved that are essential in the era of Industry 4.0 and the Digital Economy.xxx
To telegraph the punchline, our world economy has become ever more complex, which
has implications both for governance and the economic profession in general.
As for governance, the kind of intelligent economic governance following the
principles mentioned above can enshrine the worldview of Hans Selye quoted in the
introduction: to observe what everyone is watching but no one sees. In this way, policy is more
likely to successfully identify the positive and negative effects of Industry 4.0 and the Digital
Economy together with the key interactions. Because of the complexity policymakers face,
avoiding really bad outcomes rather than pushing policymaking to perpetually optimise the
good ones is a more instructive way forward.
As far as the economic profession is concerned, complexity implies that economists
should not concentrate merely on structures (gothic cathedral) but also on processes and their
dynamic relationships. Wassily Kandinsky, the great Russian painter, considered the 19th
century as an age of either-or, while the 20th and 21st centuries can be interpreted as an age of
and, when: age of multiplicity, simultaneity, connections, growing networks, asymmetrical
interdependency, globalization of side-effects, non-linear changes, fluctuations on microscale
having impacts on macroscale, and cumulative causation are all in the cards. Our socio-
economic system is an open, dynamic and adaptive system embracing a large number of diverse
interacting parts and being imbued by spillovers, non-linear processes, far-from equilibrium
situations. After all, our working paper is a clarion call for a broader research canvas, for a new
economic thinking which is to marry economics with the approach of complexity science to
draw a more realistic picture about economic phenomena (Industry 4.0). Metaphorically, we
must paint a new Arnolfini Portrait in the spirit of Jan van Eyck who made a distinct shift from
gothic style towards more realism.
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23
v Open source malwares can attack and disrupt public services. This was exactly what happened to the Finnish
heating system in November 2016. Or, just think of ransomwares, WannaCry and Petya resulting in
unprecedented havoc in 2017.
vi Our socio-economic system is a far-from equilibrium system, in which the spontaneity of entrepreneurial spirit
is of immense importance and it, by very nature, maintains fundamental uncertainty (i.e. innovation and
uncertainty are the dynamic sources of each other). See: Kovacs (2014).
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ix Besides, increasing the national income is vital since evidence from the last 40 years showed that energy
intensity could be reduced in countries that were getting richer and richer (Csereklyei et al., 2016).
x Subsidising biofuels had first moderated the consumption, then they reduced the prices of traditional fuels
which finally triggered even higher consumption for them (Holland et al., 2013). Another example for the work
of Jevons paradox is the systemic failure of green logistics initiatives in the last decades. See: Klumpp (2016).
xi International Federation of Robotics.
xii Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, China.
xiii Our modern economy is interspersed with manipulation and deception (Akerlof and Shiller, 2015) which can
result in excessive credit consumerism and in excessive indebtedness of corporate and household sectors.
xiv Senior managers and employees are willing to leave their company for another one being at the forefront of
digitalisation (Kane et al., 2016). This type of syphoning effect also encourages faster digitalisation.
xv This was demonstrated by Hershbein and Kahn (2016) in case of the Great Recession (2007-2009).
xvi Kane et al., (2015)
xvii The decreasing employment in manufacturing in developed countries has been accompanied with an increase
in the emerging markets like China (Palvia and Vemuri, 2016). Still, the weakening jobless growth in the
developing countries aggravated further the income and wealth inequalities (Piketty, 2014) by encoding a
chronic instability into the world economy.
xviii It is likely that the pace of absorbing displaced workers by other sectors will be slower as compared to previous
industrial revolutions. Albeit Gregory et al., (2016) reveals that the aggregated labour demand has increased in
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the EU between 1999 and 2010; the authors forget to take into account the followings: 1) the spatial distribution
of labour has dramatically changed (certain regions are emptying); 2) the middling jobs (semi-skilled workers,
with low or medium wages) have been to a great extent hollowing out due to the automation (Autor, 2015); 3) the
boom in the construction sector was the primary reason behind the measured increase in aggregate labour demand
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every previous revolution had a deskilling feature (de Pleijt and Weisdorf, 2017), workers have to upskill
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xix O’Neil (2016), a renowned data scientist and hedge-fund manager, sensitively illustrated that quantophrenic
behaviour (i.e. extensive quantification) has negative effects on workplace morale and collective ethos.
xx Candidates’ credibility for a job is popularly evaluated on the basis of their credit history. This is more like a
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xxvi Fostering ‘positive finance’ that feeds into the transformation process. See: Guez et al. (2015).
xxvii For the data, see Nolen et al. (2016).
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xxviii The power of highly flexible labour market seems to be ailing even in Denmark (Andersen, 2015). Such
system stands or falls on at least two things: an effective activation policy and high job creation. But, Industry
4.0 together with extensive digitalisation (incl. automation) make these prerequisites less and less feasible.
xxix For such a utopian idea, based on ICT modernisation to control the production and the economy as a whole,
enough to think of the Chilean CyberSyn system of Salvador Allende.
xxx Old recognitions have not been reversed into the oblivion. Adam Smith recommended The Wealth of Nations
to read together with The Theory of Moral Sentiments in which Smith looked beyond the invisible hand of the
market and emphasised the crucial importance of morale in real socio-economic development. Importantly, even
the state can have a destructive effect on morale, especially if it strengthens and deepens dependency culture
rather than supporting the equalisation and extension of opportunities, as the Nobel-laureate Amartya Sen
(1993) highlighted. A fully equal society cannot be a policy target unless policy is to stifle down innovation and
long term development. Inequality means uncertainty that makes people work harder and innovate. In this sense,
a certain degree of inequality is of paramount importance since it represents a key driving force of innovation.
This was once recognised by Kaldor (1955-1956). What is therefore worth pursuing is equability (equal
opportunities) in the world of Industry 4.0 but not through inexorably expanding the welfare state, which would
strengthen the dependency culture, but by the efficiency-increasing dismantling of it to eliminate the obstacles
to broadening the opportunities of people, as Wilhelm Röpke suggested (see: Röpke (1979)).
